ON! F ecnnnniists estimate that 5 percent or r)ir)rt of all farms ct.u'r'entlv in business will go into bankr'uptcv in I 986, and that one farm in seven will fail within the next four year's. A recent study In' two agricultural economists estima tes tI at far'r ii le r)clers may write oft' as much as $50 billion in bad far-m debt over the next four year's, with S2t) billion cited as the ''most pr'obable loss estimate! Such projections of losses on farm loans may be high Nevertheless act ual losses to dat e already have been large enough to cause a substantial in crease ii) the failui-e 'ate among agricultural banks Accotinting for 22 percent of bank failures between) 1981 and 1983, agricultural banks have made up about two-thirds ol all failed banks since iul~'1984', 62 agricultural banks failed during 1985.' Moreover', the l"ar'm Credit System, a group of feder'aflv sponsored agencies that lends to farmer's, announced this fall that it will need direct assistance fr-om the federal governn tent to stay ii) operation! Ordinarily, the failur-e of some farmer-s and some far-m lenders need not attract more attention than we 
cur-r'entlv pay to the thousands of business fir'rirs that fail each~'ear'.'l"or several reasons, I towever', the cr,rr'-rent farm debt situation has attracted special attention, First, projections of' lar-ge losses concentrated in agriculture have cr-eated concern about tire ec000riirc health of the entire industry. Moreover', the farm cr-edit crisis has develo ied at a time wI ie I) I oarr losses of commercial banks alr'ead~' are relatively high. Finally, the appar'ent vulner-ability of the banking system to the far-ni credit crisis has in creased prrblic concern abotrt the continued viability of many banks that have beer) heavily committed to agr'icu ltrrr'al ler iding.
Some economists lur'tlier' believe that problems it) the far-rn sector nil I spill over into the rest ol the economy, causing slower economic gr-on'tl) and lower em plovme rit. One recent st I r lv suggested that bank failures resulting from losses on farm loans could cause investor's to view iuvestnrents in all privately issued securities as uior'e risky," Consequently, inter'-est r-ates on all privately issued securities cor,rld rise relative to the interest rates on V.S.'l'r'easurv securities, causing a slowing in economic gr'owtl). 'l'his article discusses reasons for thinking that this effect either will not occur' or will be relatively insignificant and/or sb ort-'lived. 'From 1979 'From through 1984 , an average ot 20.000 business firms failed each year. U.S. Department of Commerce (1985) .
'Schink and Urbanchuk. In particular, the Wharton study indicates wider spreads between the commercial paper rate and the threemonth Treasury bill rate. A related study by Chase Econometrics (1985) deals with the more narrow question ot a default by the Farm Credit System on its bonds, its study shows even more substantial spitlover effects, with private debt interest rates rising by 300-400 basis points over rates on government debt. 
Farm Land Values and Farm Debt
tf the failure of lan-ge numbers of far-ms~~~ffects both interest rates and general economic activity adversely, then assisting the agricultur'al sector of the economy may make sense oven-and above the usual r-ationale based on the social benefits of maintaining the family farm. The magnitude of federal aid necessary to keep far-rn lender's viable, howeyer, has been estimated to be in the "multi-billions" of dollars for the Fartl) Credit System alone. In light of current efforts to reduce the feden'al budget deficit, it seems pn-udent to assess the likelihood that tile current financial problems of the farm sector will affect the whole economy adversely.
'ibis article analyzes the influences of the curr-ent farm credit cr-isis on the economy in two ways. 'l'he first approach examines the performance of financial o tar'ket S and tIte econonw in r-ecent year's, Since the financial trouble of farmer-s became nodes pread afier the average price of farmland started declirlirlg in) 1981, we 0) igl it expect to observe some adverse effects ort he economy already. 't'be second approach examines the effects of the far-m financial crisis of the 1920s (ill be economic actiyit~'of that per-iod 'l'i'iF OEU.GI.N A~J I) EFFFCFS OF 1 1'IW' (AjRREr' I FARM CHLIJfl CRISIS 'l'oday's farm crisis developed as a r'esult of tIle r'apid increases in the prices of far-mlan'rd in the 1970s tllr-ougb 1981 and the subsequent declines in land prices since then. The 1970s and early 1980s wer-e year's of rapid inflation. l-'r'om 1972 thr-ortgh 1981, the GNP deflator rose at an 8.1 percent average annual rate while tIle C Pt rose at a 9 per-cent aver-age rate. 'I'he price of far-mnlarid rose even ninor-e rapidly: th eaverage price of an acre of farm real estate rose at a 14.4 I er'cent annual rate from 1972 thm-or.ngb 1981 Cbar 1 indicates that total farm debt rose in step with the rise in the pr-ices of farn'nland. ,Movements in) 'Between 1972 and 1981 , the price of farmland increased at an average annual rate of 14.4 percent, while, over the same period, total farm debt increased at a 13.5 percent average annual rate. 
1.0
Ia nd pores and fat'm debt over this period were closely related for two r-easons : First, many far-mers who bought land while land pr'ices were rising hor'-'owed heavily to finance their purchases. Second, the rising land prices enabled farmers to pledge their land as collateral for genen al purpose loans.
Unfortunately for' farmer's, prices of farm commodities did not r'ise as fast as farmland prices chart 21. From 1972 thn'ough 1981, an index of prices received by farmers on all fan-ni) pn'oducts rose at an 8.1 percent rate, equal to the general inflation r'ate. Furthen'mon-e, most of the rise in the index of farm prices oven' these years was concentrated in 1973-74 and 1978-79. Prices r'eceived by farmers have not risen as rapidly as the GNU deflator since 1979. Thus, during the years of rapid inflation, the price of farmland rose substantially faster than the prices received by farmers for-their output.
The general r-ate of inflation slowed sharply after 1981, making farniland ownership less valuable as an inflation hedge. In) addition, the price of farm output relatiye to nonfarm prices has declined In' 1.8 percent since 1981. For many farmer's who hon-rowed heavily during the penod of rapid incr'eases in the price of farmland, prices received for tar'n) i products have not heel) high enough to cover their operating expenses and meet their' loan pavmen ts. Consequer it lv, faror lenders have begun incurr'nng losses on~the loans on which farmers have defar,tlted and the protection of collater'al for farm lenders has been eroded by fallirlg farmland pr-nces. sales of farm out put het\veent 850.001) and S500,000.Ã bout two-thir'ds of' the family-size rurrtnier'rial farms have ratios of' debt to assels helow 40 percent: the tSD 1 \ consider-s these farms to have no apparent financial problems. \loneuven. these far'ruts acrocrnt for' less than 31) percent of the debt held b~'ujediurn-size farms, in contn-ast. about 14 percent of family-size commercial farms have debt-lu-assets ratios of7O per'-cent or' higher', and these account fun' over' 30 pe'rent of' the debt. In) total about our-third of fanrtily-size 8 Farms with less than $50,000 in annual sales tend to be parf'time operations for the farmers: for these farms, there are nonfarm sources of income available to meet the debt payments. In contrast, many of the farms with annual sales over 5500,000 are specralty operations, like cattle feedlots and poultry farms, which have operated profitably with high debt-to-assets ratios for many years. Farms with relatively large annual sales tend to be more profitable than smaller farms, Only 1 percent of all farms have sales in excess of $500,000 but they account for more than 60 percent of farm income. In contrast, the group of farms with less than $40000 in annual sales actually shows a loss equal to 6.5 percent of farm income.
Onh
In comparing farms that sell between $40,000 and $500,000 of product annually with those selling more than $500,000, the larger farms have an income-to-equity ratio of 16.5 and an income-to~debt ratio of 28.6 vs. figures of 3.3 and 11.9, respectively. for the smaller category of commercial~sizefarms. For more detail on holdings of farm debt by size of larm and alternative estimates of the number of farms in serious financial trouble, see Bullock (1985) . commercial farms hold mor'e than 70 per-ce,nI of this farm rategorvs debt and have debt -to-assets ratios that indicate some financial st tess. It is this minority of farmer's -and their' Iendem-s -who acrount fur' the pr-uhleru debt.
'l'he spr-etd hetn'eerr the intenes I rates on connmer'-cial paper' and't'r-casn.rrv hills --one treasure of the spread between interest n'ates on private ar'rcl ptnhlir debt -appear's to r'eflect a r'isk pentium on privately isstjed debt, Of the year's cover-ed in chart 3, the spread was largest fn'om 1980 through 1982, essentially one cur'rtintluus period of economic recession.'' his 'ate spnincl also widened fona few mouths around the tune of' the financial crisis at the Continental Illinois National Bank in May 1984, perhaps reflecting investurs concern about the pussi )le consequences of failrrr'e h_v Continental Illinois, 'l'her'e is little evidence, however, that the growing farm credit crisis since 1981 has had adverse etfects or) the economy. Real economic activity has been rising since late 1982. \Iur'euver', the spread between the commercial pirpen' rate and rhe 'l'r'easury hill rate gmen'ali~'has in;rrrou'td lulluwing the sharp rise in tire Cnlun'e nate au)ong agr'icultur'al banks that began in) the second half of 1984 chant 31, In fact, since mid-1984. the spread hetweer) inten-est n'ates on private and ptnhlie debt instn'umentts oh similar' maturity has brent as low as at any per'rud since 1978, 'l'hus,~vhile this 'ate spread reflects a nisk pm-erttiunl). the risk premium clues nut appeal' to be significantly correlated with pn'oblenis in) agriculture as suggested by srtndies warning of a general financial crisis,
Since history fn'equentlv r'epeats itself. we may learn sou)etl'ning In' looking hack to similar' pn'uhlernts in an manlier' era, 'lbeagn'icultun'al sector' of tIne t.S. eeurlumy exper'ienced a financial crisis during the l920s that was similar' in many rvspecls to far'mnen-s' and tan'm lenclc'n's' cun'n'ent financial pn-ohlems. 'lu make Ibis cxpcn'ience n'elevant fun' an) analysis of the l980s, we fir-st Agricultu t'e accounted for' mt.rel) larger shares of employment and output in the U.S. economy before Won-id War I tbar) in the 1980s. "' In 1 90t), fur' example, about 41 percent of total employment was in) the farm sector', 'l'be share of the lahor' force on farms was declining, falling to just under' 30 pen'rent by 1913. In) contrast, the far-n) sector' accounted for' only 3 percent of ci~ilianemployment in 1981, the year' of the recent peak ir't farmland pr-ices. pr'i\'ate domestic pr-odun.:t . liv the fh'e veal-s ending in 1921, that percentage declined to 14.5 percent. In contrast, farm utttput accounted tot' ahuut :i pen'cent of gross pr-ivate domestic product in 1981 . 'ihese t.:untrasts suggest that ad~'er'sedl eye Iopmmnts in the far-rn sector should have had larger effects on the economy before World War I tItan in the 1980s, 'She far-rn sector was the major expot't sector of the 1.1,5, economy hefom'c the war-, with fart)) exports accounting fun' 65 pen'cd~ntof the dollar value uf all t .5, expor-ts ir) 1901. That shar-e uf total exports declined gradualI~'to 46 per-cent in 19 t 3, inn t rose again tu 48 percent it) 1920, In) 1981 , agn'icultur'al pi'oclucts accotrnted fur' 18.6 per'cent of U.S. nwr'chandise exports.
rl~heGrowing Importance of Credit fin' 4grtcniture
Sever-al developments made the a"aihahilit'v of credit more intpor'tant fbr tan-men's by the late I SODs than it Most farm mortgage loans had maturities of thr'ee to five years.: Maturities of farm mortgage loans tended to he shor'test at commercial banks; about half of these loans had maturities of one year or less." Shorter loan " Eichengreen (1984) and Olsen (1925) . "Farmers did not like the terms on which mortgage credit was made available to them, They considered the interest rates on tarm mortgage loans to be too high. Many farmers also considered the maturity of farm mortgage loans to be too short. See Eichengreen, Higgs (1971), and Stock (1984) .
" Olsen, matt.rnties made tarmer's r'not'e vulner'ahle to ('or-edosure by creditor's, Although a f'ar'mer experiencing temporan' financial distress orchnar-ily might he able to meet the payments on an outstanding nl)ortgage loan, lenders might not r-enew the moi-tgage loan if it matured while a far-mer was having a financial problem. 
World War t and the Edrin Finsmchl Crisis of the 1920s
The farm financial crisis of the 1920s resulted f'rom the response of the U.S. agricultur'al sector to the disruption to agricirltun-al production that occurred in Western Eut-ope dur-ir'tg World War' I. The nations of Westet-o Eur-ope inur-eased their' agricultur-al irnpor'ts to replace lost pr'oduo;tion. This caused the dollar value of U.S. far'm exports to rise shan'plv during the war and shor-tly thereafter char-t 41. Prices of farm products and far-mIamI rose sharply during these penod5 in response to the increase in foreign demand for [IS. farm products.
Farmers borrowed substantially during the war' to buy land that was rising r'apidlv in value and to) spend more on non-land inpr.rts to expand production. [ann mortgage debt increased from 54.7 billior) on ,fanuarv 1, 1914, to 510.2 hilliun on january 1, 192 t . Non-realestate farm loans at cornrnet'cial banks rose fr-on) 51.6 billion to S3.9 billion over the same period.
U.S. farm exports declined after' the war-, as far-rims in Western Europe r'esrrmedl production Idhar't 41, The decline in export demand for t.I,S, farm pr'oolucts contrrhuted to a reduction it) farm prices r-elative to prices of industrial commodities. This n-atio of far-mi) to) nonfarm prices peaked it) 1920, them) declined sharph' in 1921 chart SI, l'be.aver'age pr-ice of far-mland contintied to rise through 1920, then declined it) each subseqirent ear thr-ough 1928 Ichar't UI, Declines in the prices of farm output and the value of farmland drove mans' farmer's into) bankruptcy anol mans' agricultural banks into failure, Finn) t 921 to) 1929, an aver-age of 635 banks failed per year', con~~-pared with an average of 88 bank failur-es per~'ear o~'er the prenous 20 years.
Charts 5 and 6 dompar'e the declines it) pr-ices of farm commodities and land it) the I 920s with those of the 1950s. These compam-tsons show declines much more severe than what has beet) observed so fan' in the 1950s. F'irst, the relative price of farm output declined more in the 1920s than in the 1980s Ichart SI. Second, there were sharper declines in far'mland prices~the collateral base for far-m debt after 1920 than after' 1981 chart Si. Other things equal, these declines would have had n ruch gr'eater' effects on the ability of farmers to secure new shor't-tetm debt or' sustain old debt II) -7
Annual
. As noteol pr'evioush', agr icmlt mtr-e's larger share of total otrtpt.tt in the I 920s implies that problems it) the Ia in sect or would have had larger' ad~'er'seeffects on UN P and emplon'ment in the t920s tham'r in the 1980s. Yet the 1920s veto'. year's of gener-al economic pr-osper--i ty. Real UN P noise at a 4.2 per'cet)t ant) mral r'ate fr-on) 1920 through 1929. up front an average of 3 percent at)0 ual gt-owt h over' the prior 20 \'eans. ' l'he riu 0) her' of persons employed grew at a 1 .8 p er'cent rate frome 1920 thn'oirgh 1929, about the same, rate as over' the prior 20 year's Although general economic growth might have been e\'en stronger-without agr'icultmtr'e's problems, the actual economic pemi'o 1 nanc.e cer-tain lv rIreets or exceeols most historical rioir'ms.
Declines in the prices of far-m outprt and farmland in the 1920s also had relatively small effects or) economic activit~'in the farm sector, Although far-ri) outport fell sharply in 1921, the index of oiier'all farm outport had regained its pr'e~iouspeak ti~'1925. l"arm omr tp ott rose at a 1.4 per'cen t annual rate fr-om 1925 l'rt'ough 1929, while teal UN P r-ose at a 3.2 percent rate. 'l'otal emplovnient in the far'm sector essentialh' was ut-rchanged ir'r the t920s ; the growth of emplovn)ent occur-n-ed in the nonfar'mu sector-.
1 low could such a sevent, deflation in the far'r'n sccton', with widespread farm liankr'uptcies, I rave such small effects on farm oiutput? 'l'he answer involves tIm process of bankruptcy it) mm' capitalistic economic svsten'n . When lan'men's go hant kn'upt, their land and equipment do tiot go out of pr'oduction; these n'esot.r r-ces instead ar-c sold to other farmer-s at reduced prices. It is the lower prices that make it pr'ofItable for other farmer's to Ii uv the land and equipment even though prices for' fan'm output are lower', 'l'hus. h r'oirgl t the process of bar tkr'or p tc\'~Iar'm assets are r'epr'iced to levels low enomrgh to make their continued mrse lin'olitable for farmer's.
Finally, if higher' ha rik failin re r-ates camrse an in crease in risk lit' tmiums on privately issmred rleht . this effect also should have heel) stronger in the I 920s that) it) the 1 980s, especially since federal deposit instrr'ance olid n tot exist then. Despite the large numlier' of bank fa ilur'es during the I 920s, however', the spread betweer t the corn menc ial paĩer' 'ate and the \'ield or) short-term 'l'n'easrrr' secotr'ities olid nut widen durmg that decaole chart 71. '''I'bus, tie financial distr-ess in the agr'icttltir 'al sector oif the economy did not seem to) produce an mm-ease in risk premiums on pnn'atelv issued delit.
lntht.'idual Bank fl:tiliires vs. the Liquidity uij'the Bankiny System
'the pniman' r'eason that the bank failures had sorch little influence on over'all economic activity in the 1920s was that the rnoriev supply grew fast enoiugh to smrppoir't growth in economic acti~it~' and to fo 'esfall liquidity pr'olilenns in the banking system as a whoile. Deposits in) the many failed banks were simply tratisfen'r'eol to solvent banks. "ith rio oven-all r'edmtctirin in the rnor rev stock, Beca orse the quantity of money is cI oselv r'elateol to aggr'egate spending and economic activity, the gr'owlh in the morne\' stock facil italed growth in overall ecoinioo)ic acti~itvI char-t Si. Althoiugh the money supply dr'opped sharply in 192 t , olornirig a recession after' \Vorlol War I, XII I demand oleposits lilus cirn'rencv 1 r'oise at aliomtt a 3 per'cent anti oral 'ate froim jt.tne 1921 through .lmtne 1929. 'l'his in cr-ease facilitated the economic gr'owt h that occurred over that period, in sharp cointr'ast to the beginning oif the Un-eat Depression 1930-33], which saw the rnone\' stock decline at an 11 per-cent annual r'ate I cItart Si,'" coNcLUSIorhjS Many farmer's with high r'atios of debt to assets wrIl goi hankr-u pt unless the~'receive large gover'n menl subsidies, Some ecoir'ioimnists have war-ned that rising far'm hankr-mrptcies will cause the faihr re of mans' lar'ri.n lianks and prissiblv the Farm Cn'edit System. Other-s even have suggested that far'm loan losses are likely to pt-odotce a genuine financial crisis unless federal aid is pr'ovided.
'the endence presented ir this ariicle does not support the argument that the far-rn financial crisis~' illadver-selv affect the entire ecoinornv. 'l'he financ ial problems of many far-men's have become senoons since 1981 primarily hecamtse the aver-age pn'ice of far-mland has declined, 'tim float tcial problems of farmers, howeven-, have noit increased the n-dat ive in ter'es t mates on "The average spread in the 1 920s was 127 basis points. The lowest and highest average spreads were 73 basis points in 1928 and 231 basis points in 1920. '~Fora detailed analysis of how declines in the money stock were related to the Great Depression, see Friedman and Schwartz (1963) .
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